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This paper wants to contribute to a novel and fast growing literature which intro-
duces game theory in the analysis of real options investments in competitive set-
tings. Speciﬁcally, in this paper we focus on the issue of multiple equilibria and on
the implications that different equilibrium selections may have for the valuation of
real options. We present some theoretical results and we apply our analysis to the
valuation of a real estate development in South London.
The application of real options theory to commercial real estate has developed
rapidly during the last 15 years and various pricing models have been applied to
real estate developments to value embedded real options (see for example Titman
(1985), Grenadier (1996), Williams (1991) and Williams (1993)). The combination of
game and real options theory has proved to offer useful insights for the valuation
of real estate developments in markets where different developers are in competi-
tion. As far as the pricing of real options is concerned, the existing contributions
have used either the binomial option valuation method of Rubinstein, Cox and Ross
(1979) in discrete time (see for example the early contribution of Smith and Ankum
(1993)) or an equilibrium approach in continuous time (see for example Grenadier
(1996)). In both approaches to the valuation of real options, the introduction of game
theoretical settings – in orderto model the competition between developers– implies
the possibility of multiple equilibria (i.e. multiple optimal investment decisions) and
such multiplicity is problematic for the option pricing methods.
In a set-up with continuous time, it may be the case that two developers ﬁnd
optimal to invest at the same time, but in order to value the option to invest it is
necessary to have a ﬁrst mover (the leader) and a follower. Grenadier proposed
a simple tie- breaking rule (toss of a coin) to solve this problem and Huisman et
al. (2003) have proposed a more sophisticated solution based on the use of mixed
strategies.
In a discrete time framework, developers play a simultaneous game (invest or
defer) at the beginning of each period and there can be multiple equilibria in which
either developer invests while the other defers. This is problematic because in order
to value an investment, it is necessary to have single equilibrium outcomes at each
nodeof the gameand itisnot apriori clearhowto selectbetween multiple equilibria.3
Inthispaperwepropose varioustie-breaking(orequilibriumselection)ruleswhich
are standard in game theory (min-max payoff, coin-toss, mixed strategy) and we
show how the use of different tie breaking rules can imply different valuations and
economic conclusions. For example, selecting between multiple equilibria with the
min-max payoff rather than using a coin-toss rule implies a more pessimistic val-
uation of the future payoff from deferring and hence it may imply that investing
becomes optimal when deferring would instead be optimal under a coin-toss rule
(i.e. a min-max payoff brings the investment decision forward because it gives pref-
erence to earlier cash ﬂows).
The possibility of multiple equilibria in set-up with discrete time has been men-
tioned byTrigeorgis (1996)andMarcato andLimentani(2008), butto ourknowledge,
noother paperhasso farinvestigated different tie-breaking rules and the relative im-
plications. This paper is organized in a theoretical analysis and an application of the
theory to a case study. We show the necessary conditions to have multiple equilibria
and we show under which conditions different tie-breaking rules result in different
economic conclusions. We apply the theoretical results to the valuation of a mixed-
use Development Project in South London and we show how different tie-breaking
rules imply different valuations and investment decisions.
2. NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND THE CASE OF MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
Game theory is a discipline that studies situations of strategic interaction, i.e. situa-
tions (games)in which the action ofan individual (player)affects the utility (pay-off) of
other individuals and in which individuals (players) behave strategically taking this
interdependence into account. In game theory, a solution concept is a formal rule pre-
dicting which strategies will be adopted by players, therefore predicting the result of
the game. A strategy consists of a rule specifying which actions a player should take
given theactions taken byother players. The mostcommonly used solution concepts
are equilibrium concepts. Loosely speaking, an equilibrium consists of a strategy pro-
ﬁle (one for each player) such that each player should not have any advantage by
changing her strategy. The seminal Nash (1950) equilibrium consists in a strategic
proﬁle such that each player’s strategy is a best response to the strategies chosen by
the other players. Given a set of feasible strategies for a player i and the strategies4
chosen by the other players, a best response is the strategy associated to highest pay-
off for player i. In order to clarify these concepts, we introduce the following game
in which two players decide whether to invest (I) or defer (D).
Game 1: Payoffs.
I D
I 2 , 2 4 , 3
D 3 , 4 1 , 1
The game matrix describes four possible outcomes, where the ﬁrst and second num-
ber in each cell respectively represents the payoff for the player which moves along
the rows (the “row”player) and the payoff for the player which moves along the
columns (the “column”player). If both players invest, each of them gets a pay-
off equal to 2; if the “row”player invests while the “column”player defers the re-
spectively get a payoff equal to 4 and 3; if the “row”player defers while the “col-
umn”player invests they respectively get a payoff equal to 3 and 4; if both players
defer each of them gets a payoff equal to 1. This is a symmetric game, because for
both players a speciﬁc action I (D) gives the same payoff, given the action of the
other player. In other words symmetry implies that the identities of the players can
be changed without changing the payoffs associated to the strategies. In Game 1,
given that one player invests, for the other player it is optimal to defer, because de-
ferring gives a payoff equal to 3, whereas investing gives a lower payoff equal to 2.
Likewise, given that one player defers, the optimal choice of the other player is to
invest because investing gives a payoff equal to 4, whereas deferring would give a
lower payoff equal to 1. In a Nash equilibrium every player maximizes her own pay-
off function, given all the other players strategies, hence in Game 1 there exist two
Nash equilibria. The two equilibria are respectively one in which the row player in-
vests while the column player defers and a symmetric one in which the row player
defers while the column player invests. An intuitive method to ﬁnd the Nash equi-
libria of such a 2-players games is to underline the payoffs corresponding to the best
responses. Looking at the payoffs of the row player, if the column player plays I the
best response payoff is 3, if the column player plays D the best response payoff is
4. The best response payoffs are identical for the column player given the symmetry
of the game. As the game matrix shows, underlying the payoffs which correspond5
to the best responses we can easily identify the two Nash equilibria of the game as
those situations in which both players play the best responses to each other.
Game 1: Nash Equilibria.
I D
I 2 , 2 4 , 3
D 3 , 4 1 , 1




I 4 , 4 2 , 1
D 1 , 2 3 , 3
Looking at the payoffs of the row player, if the column player plays I the best re-
sponse for the row player is to invest, as investing gives a payoff of 4 while deferring
would give a payoff of 1. If the column player plays D the best response for the row
player is to defer, as deferring gives a payoff of 3 while investing would give a lower
payoff of 2. The best response payoffs are identical for the column player given the
symmetry of the game. As the game matrix shows, underlying the payoffs which
correspond to best responses we can easily identify the two Nash equilibria of the
game, respectively “invest, invest”(I,I) and “defer, defer”(D,D). It is useful to look at
a generalized version of the same game.
Game 3: Generalized Payoffs.
I D
I a , a b , c
D c , b d , d
Notice that the symmetry of the game implies that for both players a speciﬁc action I
(D) gives the payoff a (c) given that the other player plays I and it gives the payoff b
(d)given that the other player plays D. Assuming that a,b,c,d ar all different payoffs,
we can identify two conditions:
(i) a > c, d > b6
and
(ii) a < c, d < b.
either of which is necessary and sufﬁcient for the existence of multiple equilibria.
If a > c and d > b, as the matrix game below shows, the two underlined Nash
equilibria are I,I and D,D.
Game 3a. Generalized Nash equilibria if a > c and d > b.
I D
I a , a b , c
D c , b d , d
If a < c, d < b, as the matrix game below shows, the two underlined Nash equilibria
are I,D and D,I.
Game 3b. Generalized Nash equilibria if a < c, d < b.
I D
I a , a b , c
D c , b d , d
Each of the two conditions is necessary for for the existence of multiple equilibria as
it is immediate that if a > c, d < b the unique equilibrium is I,I and that if a < c, d > b
the unique equilibrium is D,D.
In the case of multiple equilibria there is a natural problem of equilibrium se-
lection.
1 We hereby introduce three very simple selection (i.e. tie-breaking) rules.
The main point we want to illustrate is that different tie-breaking rules may imply
sensible differences in valuations and therefore it is very important to know the im-
plications of different decision rules.
Expected payoff rule. In the case of two equilibria this rule implies that the two
equilibria have equal probability (i.e. 50% probability each). Intuitively, given that
the two equilibria are exactly symmetric, according to this rule the equilibrium ef-
fectively taking place is decided by the toss of a fair coin. Going back to the previous
1The literature on equilibrium selections is quite vast and we can refer the interested readers to the
seminal contribution of Harsany and Selten (1988).7
example of game 3, if a < c, d < b, as the matrix game shows, the two Nash equi-
libria are I,D and D,I. Under the expected pay-off rule, for each player the expected
pay-off from taking part in the game is
b+c
2 .
Min-max payoff rule. In the case of two equilibria the rule implies that a player who
wants to value the payoff from participating in the game, assigns probability one to
the equilibrium in which she gets the lowest payoff. This rule is known as min-
max because this is the minimum payoff that will be achieved playing rationally (i.e.
playing the best response). It is intuitive that such valuation of the game’s payoff is
more “pessimistic”than the one of the expected payoff rule and could possibly imply
more risk aversion. Going back again to game 3b, given a < c, d < b and in addition
b > c (b < c), for each player the expected payoff from participating in the game is
equal to c (b).
Max-maxpayoff rule. In the case of two equilibria the rule implies that a player who
wants to value the payoff from participating in the game, assigns probability one to
the equilibrium in which she gets the highest payoff. This rule is known as min-max
because this is the maximum payoff that will be achieved playing rationally (i.e.
playing the best response). It is intuitive that such valuation of the game’s payoff
is the more “optimistic”than the one of the expected payoff rule and could possibly
imply a move towards a more aggressive risk taking position. Going back again to
game 3b, given a < c, d < b and in addition b > c (b < c), for each player the expected
payoff from participating in the game is equal to b (c).
It is worthy to specify that we have decided to focus on those three simple rules
because they are intuitive from the valuation point of view.
2 Moving from the min-
max rule to the max-max rule can be intuitively interpreted to move from the most
risk averse valuation to the least risk aversion valuation as the certainty equivalent
that an investor should to take part in the game decreases. The expected payoff rule
averages with equal weights the valuations of the two extreme rules, we could think
about other cases in which the min-max and the max-max valuations are averaged
with different weights.
2Thetheory of equilibrium selection is quite vastandmoresophisticated –orcomplicated–rules could
in principle be used.8
3. MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND DIFFERENT TIE-BREAKING RULES IN THE BINOMIAL
VALUATION MODEL
Smit and Ankum (1993) merge game theory with real option analysis in order to
modelcompetition betweentwoinvestorswhobothhavetheoption todeferaproject.
We present a simple version of their model including all the necessary features in or-
der to illustrate our contribution. We consider two investors A and B that are poten-
tially equal and therefore can be modeled through a symmetric game. Each investor
has a strategy set Xi = {I,D} with i = A,B, where (I) is the decision to invest in
the project, while (D) is the decision to defer the investment. The decision to defer
D, according to the real option analysis , can be modeled as a call option C. Smit
and Ankum (1993) consider the binomial model of Rubinstein, Cox and Ross (1979)
in order to value the option to defer the investment. Following their model, we la-
bel with St,h the underlying value of the asset at time t after h upwards movements
along the binomial tree and Kc stands for the investment costs. Since we only con-
sider the pure strategies to invest versus defer (i.e. I and D are mutually exclusive),
the symmetry of the game implies three possible outcomes in each period:
• When both investors A and B invest, the game ends. In this situation we start
to note the ﬁrst novelty that the addition of competition brings: instead of the
usual intrinsic value St,h−KC each investor gets a payoff equal to ν St,h−KC,
where ν is the proportion of value when both competitors invest.
• When both investors defer, nature (N) moves (we can have either an upward
movement u or a downward movement d) along the binomial tree and the
game is repeated.
• When one investor (leader) invests ﬁrst and the other (follower) decides to
invest later, i.e. defers. In this case the payoff of the leader is θSt,h − KC.
When the follower starts to invest her payoff will be the proportion of the
value left by the other competitor, hence (1 − θ)St,h − KC.
In the case of Smit and Ankum (1993), θ > ν because investing earlier gives more
marketpower. Inournumericalexampleswedonotonlyconsiderthisstandard case
butalso the case where θ < ν which isa case where two developmentprojects started
at the same time produce positive externalities. Such case is interesting for many real
estate projects as the construction of complementary complexes of buildings (e.g.9
housing block and shopping centre) may result in higher individual values for the
beneﬁt obtained by the presence of the other property. if we take a housing block
and a shopping centre as an example, we see that houses will be worth more if there
is an accessible shopping centre in the area. And on the other hand, a centre is more
valuable if there are new houses built in the area as the determine an increase of
potential customers for the same shopping centre’s radius. This argument is also
true in the case of the development of two similar properties. If we consider the
construction of two shopping centres with slightly different focus and tenancy mix,
they may attract a bigger number of customers because customers may be willing
to travel a longer distance should they ﬁnd two malls not far from each other. This
would increase the radius the two shopping centres serve and then augment the
retail spending and, along with it rents (through revenue-related rents) and hence
capital values. Finally, for a similar reason we also consider non standard cases in
which the proportion of the value left to the follower differs from (1 − θ). Figure 1
illustrates a two period version of this game
3.
Insert ﬁgure 1 here.
We can give the payoff matrix of the game played at time t in state of nature h.
Game 4. Generalized game in node t,h.
Invest Defer





t,h , θSt,h − KCe−r(T−t) Ct,h , Ct,h
3Investment costs are not discounted in the ﬁgure but are discounted at the exponential rate in the
remaining of the analysis.10
where:





(1 − θ)St,h − KCe−r(T−t) , 1
er(T−t)[qC
post














∀t = 0,...,T, ∀h = 0,...,T and i = A,B.
Ei
t,h indicates the Nash equilibrium payoff for player i in the game played at time t
and state of nature h. Notice that the fact it is possible to have equilibria I,D or D,I
in which one player gets a different payoffs from the other implies that Ei
t,h – and
recursively Ci
t,h – are indexed by the player’s identity i.
In order to complete the formulation we remember that at maturity T we have the
following values:






Oncegiven the binomial tree with gamesin eachnode, itwill beeasytoseta strategic
tree for each investor. In order to value the option to defer, it is necessary to assign
a value to each game-node. Which value should be assigned in the case of multiple
equilibria?
4
Generally, following the analysis of game 3 in section 2 we have the following
two necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria at a
generic node t,h: either (i) θSt,h − KCer(T−t) > Ct,h, C
post
t,h > ν St,h − KCer(T−t) where
equilibriaare both I,Dand D,Ior (ii) θSt,h−KCer(T−t) < Ct,h, C
post
t,h < ν St,h−KCer(T−t)
where equilibria are both I,I and D,D.
In order to illustrate the possibility of multiple equilibria it is useful to analyze
the game matrix at maturity. The ﬁrst reason for doing this is that the binomial
4Smit and Ankum (1993) ignore this case, Trigeorgis (1996) mentions this possibility but rules it out,
Limentani and Marcato (2008) mention this possibility but modify the payoff function in such a way
to rule it out.11
valuation model imposes to start at maturity and to move backwards. The second
reason is that the condition for multiple equilibria at a generic node t,h cannot say
much on the values of the parameters which will imply multiple equilibria, given
that St,h,Ct,h and C
post
t,h are endogenous variables which depend on the parameters
and on the equilibria in the future periods. Instead studying the game at maturity
T implies that both CT,h and C
post
T,h are equal to zero and hence we can ﬁnd precise
conditions on the parameters for multiple equilibria. Consider the following payoff
matrix for the game at maturity.
Game 5. Generalized game in node T,h.
Invest Defer
Invest ν ST,h − KC , ν ST,h − KC θST,h − KC 0 , 0
Defer 0 , θST,h − KC 0 , 0
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. A sufﬁcient condition to have multiple equilibria is θ >
KC
ST,h > ν.
Proof. Start from the sufﬁcient condition for multiple equilibria I,D and D,I at matu-
rity T (as illustrated in game 3 in section 2): θST,h−KCer(T−t) > 0, νST,h−KCer(T−t) <
0. Together the two inequalities imply the condition in proposition 1. ￿
The economic intuition behind proposition 1 is that given the extent of ﬁrst mover
advantage –measured by θ and µ– the ratio between development cost Kc and in-
vestment value ST,h must be large enough so that the best response to an investment
of the competitor is to defer, and at the same time small enough so that the best
response to a deferral of the competitor is to invest.
Following the analysis of section 2, we can formally introduce the discussed tie-
breaking rules from the perspective of time t:
5















5Notice that the rules respectively average, minimize and maximize the equilibrium payoffs with
respect to the players’ identity i because payoffs are symmetric across players.12
In general terms, given a node t + 1,h + 1 in which there are two equilibria, respec-
tively with payoff E1
t+1,h+1 and E2
t+1,h+1, and a node t + 1,h with a unique equilib-
rium with payoff Ei
t+1,h, we can identify a necessary condition such that different
tie-breaking rules in node t+1,h+1 imply different equilibrium choices in node t,h.
Considering only the expected payoff versus min-max rule, referring to game 4 we
ﬁnd the following conditions:
(i) underexpected utility rule Ct,h > θSt,h−KCe−r(T−t) and C
post
t,h > νSt,h−KCe−r(T−t).
This implies that under the expected utility rule the unique equilibrium is D,D. Also










+ (1 − q)Et+1,h
￿
.
(ii) under min-max rule, Ct,h < θSt,h−KCe−r(T−t) and C
post
t,h > νSt,h−KCe−r(T−t). This
implies that under the min-max rule the equilibria are D,I and I,D. Also notice that









+ (1 − q)Et+1,h
￿
.
The intuition for which this is a necessary condition such that different tie-breaking
rules in node t+1,h+1 imply different equilibrium choices (and hence different in-
vestment/defer economic decisions) in node t,h is as follows: different tie-breaking
rules only impact the payoff of the cell D,D in game 4, therefore in order to have
different equilibria it must be that under one rule D,D is an equilibrium while under
the other it is not. Given that the payoffs in the the cell D,D are higher under the
expected utility rule, then in order to have different equilibria it must be the case
that D,D is an equilibrium only under the expected utility rule.
Once again, in order to illustrate more precise conditions on the parameters, it is
useful to take the game matrix at maturity. Take a node T,h in which the condi-
tion of proposition 1 is satisﬁed and therefore there are two equilibria D,I and I,D.
Also assume that at node T,h−1 the unique equilibrium is D,D (hence with payoffs
Ei
T,h−1 = 0 for each player i). Consider the following matrix game at node T −1,h−1
for the case of expected payoff valuation of the payoff at T,h:
Game 6. Generalized game at node T − 1,h − 1 in the case of expected utility rule at node
T,h.
Invest Defer
Invest ν ST−1,h−1 − KCe−r , ν ST−1,h−1 − KCe−r θST−1,h−1 − KCe−r , 0
Defer 0 , θST−1,h−1 − KCe−r q
2(θST − KC)e−r ,
q
2(θST − KC)e−r13
In this case the condition to have an equilibrium D,D is that
q
2(θST − KC)e−r >




sider now the following matrix game at node T − 1,h − 1 for the case of min-max
valuation of the payoff at T,h:
Game 7. Generalized game at node T − 1,h − 1 in the case of min-max rule at node T,h.
Invest Defer
Invest ν ST−1,h−1 − KCe−r , ν ST−1,h−1 − KCe−r θST−1,h−1 − KCe−r , 0
Defer 0 , θST−1,h−1 − KCe−r 0 , 0
In this case the conditions to have two equilibria (I,D) (D,I) are that (i) KC >
νST−1,h−1er and (ii) θST−1,h−1 − KCe−r > 0, which can be rewritten as νST−1,h−1er <
KC < θST−1,h−1er.
We have the following proposition.












Proof. Proposition 1 shows that the condition θST,h > KC > νST is sufﬁcient to have
multiple equilibria at maturity node T,h. The analysis of games 6 and 7 shows,
given multiple equilibria at node T,h, the conditions such that expected payoff rule
and min-max payoff rule result in different investment decisions (i.e. equilibria)
in node T − 1,h − 1. After noticing that condition (i) of game 7 is already satisﬁed
underthe condition ofproposition 1, the conditions can be rewritten asθST−1,h−1er >
Kc > ( 2
2−q)(θST−1,h−1er −
q
2θST). According to the binomial valuation model ST,h =
















The economic intuition behind proposition 2 is that given the extent of ﬁrst mover
advantage –measured by θ and µ– the ratio between development cost Kc and in-
vestment value ST,h must be large enough so that in the case of expected payoff
valuation it is a dominant strategy to defer and at the same time small enough so
that in the case of min-max payoff valuation the best response to a deferral of the
competitor is to invest. It is also important to notice that the min-max valuation of14
the future is more pessimistic and therefore implies that it is optimal to invest give
that the competitor defers, whereas the expected payoff valuation of the future is
more optimistic and therefore implies that it is always optimal to defer.
In the following section we apply the analysis to the valuation of a real estate
development in South London. We consider various values of the parameters θ and
ν in order to model different types of competition across developers. The cases in
which different tie-breaking rules imply different investment decisions satisﬁes the
conditions of propositions 1 and 2.
4. NUMERICAL EXERCISE
Development Project in South London, United Kingdom. As a numerical exam-
ple, we use a development project based on a 6 acres land South of London. Plan-
ning permission The scheme have been already granted for ofﬁces (1,350k sqm), re-
tail space [supermarket (830 sqm) and retail units (680k sqm)], a 500 space car park
anda leisure component [restaurants and bar(830ksqm), swimmingpool andhealth
club (480k sqm), casino (259 sqm) and night club (400k sqm)]. The site was acquired
at the price of £12.78 million and all data is available to us. Since the difference
between the annual cost of £150.000 to keep the strategic option open, and the an-
nual income generated by a car park managed on the site is marginal, we assume
that there is no either cost or income in deferment other than ﬁnancial costs related
to discounting (i.e. the dividend is equal to zero). The local authority wishes to
see the site completely developed and consequently has already granted planning
permissions for the actual development to be started within the next ﬁve years.
Traditional NPV Approach and Real Option Analysis. In this study, we want to
compare our game-theoretical real option results with the value obtained through
a static NPV (i.e. Net Present Value) approach. The development phase lasts 39
months, which correspond to m = 13 periods of 3 months each. We obtain the Net
Present Value by discounting the expected cash ﬂows back to period 0 (i.e. t = 0)
using an appropriate discount rate calculated as weighted average cost of capital (i.e.
WACC) k. For both cash ﬂows and WACC, we use the information set provided by






where CFt is the expected free cash ﬂow at time t and kq is the quarterly WACC.
More speciﬁcally, the cash ﬂow at time t is computed as follows:
CFt = INCt − LANDt − DEVt
where INCt, LANDt and DEVt respectively refer to income, land acquisition costs
and development expenses, all at time t. Note that there is no income in all t except
when the completed building (i.e. t = m) is sold. By contrast, land acquisition
costs are null in every period, except in the ﬁrst one. If we discount the cash ﬂows
provided by the investor, we obtain the following static NPV of the project as:
NPVp = £79.93 − £59.19 − £12.78 = £7.26 million
where £79.93 million is the present value of the selling price at completion, £59.19
million is the present value of all development costs and £12.78 million is the ac-
quisition price of the land. Clearly, according to the NPV rule, the project should be
accepted.
In addition, as the company already possesses the land, the option to defer is a func-
tion of the construction outcome only (i.e. it does not refer to the overall project
which also include the land value). Therefore the static NPV of the construction
phase only (i.e. NPVt) is obtained by adding the land cost to the static NPV of the
project:
NPVcp = £79.93 − £56.95 = £22.98 million = NPVp + LAND0
Parameters Estimation. The value of our option directly depends on 5 parameters:
initial value of the selling price S0, strike price KC, volatility of selling price σ, matu-
rity time T and risk-free rate rfr. According to the available information set, we can
easily set 4 out of 5 of these parameters:
S0 = 79.93m KC = 76m T = 5
rfr = 5%
As in Marcato etal. (2008) and Limentani and Marcato (2008), and knowing that the
selling price at completion is computed as a perpetuity of market rents (i.e. Rentt)
discounted at the relative cap rate (i.e. cap), we estimate the volatility of our de-
velopment project (i.e. σ) by applying the theory of uncertainty propagation to the
volatilities of the growth rates of market rents (i.e. h) and cap rates (i.e. g) and their
































(1 + h)3 ρgh σg σh
We use 1981 to 2007 times series data provided by a worldwide real estate brokerage
ﬁrm - CB Richard Ellis (i.e. CBRE) - which gave us access to their UK Average Cap
Rate and Rental Index. The two quarterly measures indicate respectively the cap rate
and market rent of hypothetical fully rented properties with standard speciﬁcations
(i.e. a CBRE valuer is asked to give the rent and cap rate of the hypothetical prop-
erty identiﬁed by certain speciﬁc criteria, with each valuer reporting on the same
property every quarter). The following parameters are estimated:
g = 6.79% σg = 10.11% σh = 7.14% ρgh = −0.03
while h is assumed to be equal to zero. The corresponding annual volatility is σ =
12.84%.
Since thematurity T is5years, wedevelop theexercise strategy oftheoption using
a 5-step binomial model, corresponding to a strategy model whereby the investor
can reset the strategy annually.
NegativeandPositive Externalities. Wecompute three numericalexamplesforeach
tie breaking rule by using a varying parameter ν indicating the percentage of ﬁnal
price the developer manages to achieve when the competitor also decides to invest.
In this case, the normal approach - Grenadier (1996) and Akum and Smit (1993) -
is to assume a ﬁfty-ﬁfty split between the two players. However, in a real world,
we may expect this percentage to be different from 0.5. In the case of positive ex-
ternalities in fact, the developer may beneﬁt from the investment decision taken by
the competitor. If we take the example of a residential development built next to the
mixed-used property we analyze, we immediately see the positive effect of having a
bigger number of people served within the same radius. Another example is given
by the construction of another mixed-used complex with types of retailing units and
leisure components which increase the offer made by the local authority. People may
be more willing to travel to this area because they also have the choice between two17
different properties offering complementary goods. Not necessarily a positive ex-
ternality means a parameter greater than one, but it also means a parameter which
improves the ﬁfty-ﬁfty split normally assumed as being the norm.
Valuation Results. We begin with the case in which ν = 0.5,θ = 0.55 and the fol-
lower gets (1−θ=0.45) of the ﬁnal price. The strategic tree of the option is in ﬁgure 2
for the case of expected payoff tie breaking rule, ﬁgure 3 for the case of min-max tie
breaking rule and ﬁgure 4 for the case of max-max payoff tie breaking rule.
Insert ﬁgure 2 here.
Insert ﬁgure 3 here.
Insert ﬁgure 4 here.
Not only the rules imply different valuations but the expected payoff and the min-
max rule also imply different investment decisions. Shaded regions show best-
response payoffs. Under the expected payoff rule D,D is the unique equilibrium
at node 4,4 while under the min-max rule I,D D,I are equilibria at node 4,4. The
intuition is that the min-max rule is more “pessimistic”about the future outcomes
and hence decreases the attractiveness of deferring to the future. In other words the
probability associated to the future outcome is smaller in a min-max rule, with the
expected value of our option falling as a consequence.
We report the results for the case in which ν = 0.7,θ = 0.8 and the follower gets
(1 − θ=0.2) of the ﬁnal price. The strategic tree of the option is represented in ﬁgure
5 for the case of expected payoff tie breaking rule, in ﬁgure 6 for the case of min-
max tie breaking rule and ﬁgure 7 for the case of max-max payoff tie breaking rule.
Shaded regions show best-response payoffs.
Insert ﬁgure 5 here.
Insert ﬁgure 6 here.18
Insert ﬁgure 7 here.
The rules imply different valuations. It is important to notice that if compared to the
case where ν = 0.5, investment for both players is an equilibrium strategy in a larger
number of nodes and may lead to an early exercise of the option to develop.
Finally, we report the results for the case where ν = 1.2,θ = 1 and the follower gets
1.1 of the ﬁnal price. The strategic tree of our option is represented in ﬁgure 8 for the
case of expected payoff tie breaking rule, in ﬁgure 9 for min-max rule and ﬁgure 10
for max-max tie breaking rule. Shaded regions show best-response payoffs.
Insert ﬁgure 8 here.
Insert ﬁgure 9 here.
Insert ﬁgure 10 here.
The rules imply different valuations. We hereby notice that in comparison with pre-
vious cases, investing immediately in the second period is always an equilibrium
strategy for both players.
We can now summarize our results in table 1, which reports the values of our option
according to the change in ν and tie breaking rule. Firstly, passing from a min-max
to a max-max tie breaking rule (i.e. changing the certainty equivalent of the payoff
by reducing the weight given to the lowest payoff in a multiple equilibria and by so
increasing the weight given to the highest payoff in a multiple equilibria situation),
the option value increases.
Table 1. Main results by ν and tie-breaking rule.
Min-Max Expected Max-Max
ν = 0.5 0.00 0.30 0.65
ν = 0.7 0.80 1.10 1.50
ν = 1.2 36.00 37.00 37.0019
Moving horizontally in table 1, if we assume the probability assigned to the lowest
score in a multiple equilibria case to be a proxy for risk aversion (i.e. the higher the
probability, the higher the risk aversion), we see that the value of our option to defer
the investment decreases asthe perception of risk to defer increases. In a competitive
market, in fact, a more risk averse investor will value the option to defer less than
a less risk averse investor because to defer increases the risk - and this has a higher
price for the more risk averse investor.
If we then move vertically within table 1, we notice that decreasing the negative
externalities associated with competition (i.e. increasing ν) induces an exponential
growth in the option value. This means that, for growing negative externalities,
the deferral option is seen as a loss of market power through a possible decrease in
the future payoff. On the contrary, for reduced negative externalities, whatever tie-
breaking rule is used to decide in a multiple equilibria situation, we see an increase
in the option value because payoffs beneﬁt from a competitor’s investment decision.
Normallytwo forces are ﬁghting againsteach other. On one hand, the option todefer
allows the investor to get access to the potential price uplift if real estate markets are
growing (and it does increase the negative effect because of the truncated form of
the binomial tree). On the other hand this potential uplift is eroded by a competitor
which may pre-empt the investor’s action and obtain the biggest share of the cake
by anticipating the investment decision. Instead, in the case of positive externalities,
the option to defer has two positive effects: the ﬁrst one on the potential uplift in the
market price, and the second one on the increased value of the project determined
by the development of complementary buildings (e.g. houses or ofﬁces if shopping
centre) by competitors in the area.
Finally, if we jointly consider a move from a min-max to a max-max tie breaking rule
and a decrease of negative externalities, we notice that payoff gains are increasing at
a decreasing rate. This means that the function of the marginal risk aversion effect
afore mentioned is decreasing and has a smaller effect on the option value for higher
ν and lower probability assigned to future payoff outcomes. In other words, the
effect of a reduction in negative externalities is, at the margin, greater for a more
risk averse investor than for a less risk averse investor. This effect is determined by
the advantage of deferral for a more risk averse investor and its power to assign a
smaller price to market competition.20
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has built on previous literature on real option pricing and game theory
and contributed to shed light upon the presence of multiple equilibria situations
where investors have to choose a decision rule. Along with presenting some theoret-
ical results, we apply three different decision rules (i.e. min-max payoff, coin-toss,
max-max strategy) to the valuation of a development project in South London using
a binomial option valuation model in a discrete time framework.
We show how the use of different tie breaking rules can imply different valuations
and economic conclusions. We interpret the possibility of using different rules as
a way to differentiate between different levels of risk aversion. We ﬁnd that risk
aversion reduces option value (i.e. the value is higher for a max-max than for a min-
max strategy) and this reduction decreases marginally as negative externalities (i.e.
disincentives to defer) decrease.
These results are economically important because investors with different risk
aversions may decide to use different rules (i.e. weighting between deferral and
investment payoffs) and then obtain signiﬁcantly different option values. This re-
sult has important economic implications and we envisage a need to move from a
discrete to a continuous time framework to identify the relationship between risk
aversion, speed of reaction and consequent economic and strategic decisions in a
competitive development market.21
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APPENDIX: FIGURES
FIGURE 1. Two period strategic game Investment, Defer. Source: Li-
mentani and Marcato (2008).23
FIGURE 2. ν = 0.5, θ = 0.55, Expected payoff rule.24
FIGURE 3. ν = 0.5, θ = 0.55, min-max payoff rule.25
FIGURE 4. ν = 0.5, θ = 0.55, max-max payoff rule.26
FIGURE 5. ν = 0.7, θ = 0.8, Expected payoff rule.27
FIGURE 6. ν = 0.7, θ = 0.8, min-max payoff rule.28
FIGURE 7. ν = 0.7, θ = 0.8, max-max payoff rule.29
FIGURE 8. ν = 1.2, θ = 1, Expected payoff rule.30
FIGURE 9. ν = 1.2, θ = 1, Min-max payoff rule.31
FIGURE 10. ν = 1.2, θ = 1, max-max payoff rule.